In Retrospect : The Tragedy & Lessons of Vietnam
by McNammara, Robert S.
Published by : Random House (New York) Physical details: 414 p ISBN:0812925238. ISSN:978081292 Year: 1995Item type | Current location | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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900 - 999 | 959.7043373 McN (Browse shelf) | Available | 68642 |
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959.7043373 Eve Everything we had | 959.7043373 Gol Charlie Company : what Vietnam did to us | 959.7043373 Kar Vietnam, a history | 959.7043373 McN In Retrospect : The Tragedy & Lessons of Vietnam | 959.7043373 Neu America's lost war : | 959.7043373 She A bright shining lie | 959.7043373 You First Recon-- second to none : |
Maps on lining papers.
My journey to Washington : June 9, 1916-January 20, 1961 --
The early years : January 19, 1961-August 23, 1963 --
The fateful fall of 1963 : August 24-November 22, 1963 --
A time of transition : November 23, 1963-July 29, 1964 --
The Tonkin Gulf resolution : July 30-August 7, 1964 --
The 1964 election and its aftermath : August 8, 1964-January 27, 1965 --
The decision to escalate : January 28-July 28, 1965 --
The Christmas bombing pause, an unsuccessful attempt to move to negotiations : July 29, 1965-January 30, 1966 --
Troubles deepen : January 31, 1966-May 19, 1967 --
Estrangement and departure : May 20, 1967-February 29, 1968 --
The lessons of Vietnam --
Appendix: The nuclear risks of the 1960s and their lessons for the twenty-first century.
Robert S. McNamara, secretary of defense for Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, helped lead America into Vietnam. McNamara believed that the fight against communism in Asia was worth the sacrifice of American lives, and yet he eventually came to believe that the war was, in fact, unwinnable. Outnumbered by those who wanted to continue fighting, he left the Johnson administration and his involvement in Vietnam behind. He refused any public comment on the war, and for almost three decades has kept his silence--until now. Drawing on his personal experience and a wealth of documentation--much of it only recently declassified and some presented here for the first time ever--McNamara has crafted the classic insider account of Vietnam policy making. He reveals exactly how we stumbled into the war, and exactly why it quickly became so difficult to pull out. McNamara takes us into the Oval Office for late-night discussions with the president, into the halls of the Pentagon as military strategy is argued, and into the chambers of Congress as policy is debated. He also reveals his own inner torment as the war effort becomes increasingly frustrating, and then utterly disastrous. The result is a book that is not only history of the highest order, but also revealing portrait of the trials of leadership.--Adapted from publisher description.; Secretary of Defense in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, McNamara analyzes the Vietnam War and his role in it.
68642